Bid Increments and the Robustness of Our Assumptions
This section of the supplementary appendix evaluates the robustness of our conclusion that the transaction price equals the highest bid from the second highest bidder equals which is also that bidders valuation (with two or more bidders), s(T ) =b K−1 =v N −1 , and compares this conclusion to the second assumption used by Haile and Tamer,v N −1 <b K + ∆. The first two assumptions made in our model are as follows. Assumption 1. Bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay. Assumption 2. Bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat.
These two assumptions both deal with bidding behavior and are identical to the assumptions used by Haile and Tamer (2003) .
Consider a particular auction that ends after time T with M bids, {b m } M m=1 , from K ≥ 2 different bidders (K ≤ M ). Define the potential number of bidders as the number of bidders who would have chosen to bid in an otherwise identical sealed bid auction in which any bid amount is acceptable. Assume also that associated to this auction are N (≥ K) potential bidders with valuations {v n } N n=1 . Focusing our attention on the highest bid from each bidder, {b * k } K k=1 , and organizing this set in ascending order, we obtainb 1 <b 2 < · · · <b K−1 < max k b * k =b K , withb k representing the k-th order statistic from the set {b * k } K k=1 . Define alsov n as the n-th order statistic from the set {v n } N n=1 . Given Assumption 2, Lemma 1 in Haile and Tamer (2003) guarantees that b k ≤v N −(K−k) , for k = 1, . . . , K. In particular, for K − 1, we haveb K−1 ≤v N −1 .
Our conclusion that the transaction price equals the highest bid from the second highest bidder and also equals that bidders valuation (with two or more bidders), s(T ) =b K−1 =v N −1 , does not consider that eBay auctions require a minimum bid increment, ∆. Due to the proxy bidding system, the transaction price is s(T ) =b K−1 + ∆, and any ensuing acceptable bid must be at least s(T ) + ∆. Including the increment, our Assumption 3 should be restated as follows. In the paper we argue that since ∆ is small, our conclusion of s(T ) =b K−1 =v N −1 (implied by Assumptions 1 and 2, the proxy bidding system used, and low increments) is not very restrictive.
The minimum bid increment is small when compared with the bid amount although the minimum bid increment is increasing with the bid amount. The average transaction price in our data is $79.50 and the bid increment at this price is $1 or a little more than 1% of the transaction price.
In what follows, we present evidence of the robustness of our conclusion: s(T ) =b K−1 =v N −1 . In particular, using the assumptions in Haile and Tamer (2003) , we show that the structure imposed by the eBay auction format, including the small bid increments ∆ required on eBay, ensures the lower bound of the private value distribution is very close to the upper bound.
We conduct a Monte Carlo experiment similar to the experiments presented in Section VI of Haile and Tamer (2003) with the following caveats, 1. The bid increment used, ∆, is identical to the bid increment used in eBay rather than a share of the standing bid.
2. Bidders submit proxy bids through a proxy system like the one used by eBay, rather than submitting bids which directly influence the standing bid.
It is important to note that Haile and Tamer consider more general English auctions with jump bids and potentially large bid increments, while the eBay auctions we consider use a proxy bidding system with small bid increments. eBay's proxy bid system prevents the winning bidder from submitting a jump bid over the second highest bidder.
Similar to the experiments conducted by Haile and Tamer, T n = 25 samples of n = 6 valuations are drawn from a log-normal distribution. We set the mean of this distribution equal to 79.50 and set the variance to match our observed distribution of auction sale prices. Bids are then generated in an identical fashion as in Haile and Tamer except for the differences described above. We set the probability of a jump bid, λ = 0.5 (Haile and Tamer indicate larger values of λ result in wider bounds, in their experiments they choose λ no larger than 0.25). Our experiment is replicated 500 times. lower bound is 0.0105 and the maximum difference is 0.0536. The upper and lower bounds are extremely close indicating our conclusion of s(T ) =b K−1 =v N −1 is robust. Haile and Tamer (2003) conducted an analysis similar to the one presented here and also observed that when the bid increment is small our conclusion can give estimates that are close to the truth. The most familiar auction mechanism on eBay is the second-price ascending auction in which bidders compete for an item over a certain time period, potentially raising their bids up to their maximum willingness to pay. Sellers on eBay are free to offer objects for auction at any time by posting a description of the item being auctioned, including pictures. Sellers can choose the auction length from four possible alternatives: three, five, seven, or ten days. Ten-day auctions require an extra fifty cents fee. Bidders are able to browse among thousands of auctions posted every day. Auctions are organized by categories and subcategories, which simplifies the bidders' search. Bidders are also able to use a powerful search engine. In addition, the search/category output can be ordered according to price, time listed, and time left on the auction.
Potential bidders can also search among completed auctions. This is a useful feature because it allows bidders to learn about the range of prices that a particular seller has been able to obtain in the past, as well as how much competition each specific artist's auctions usually generate. In addition, bidders who may be influenced by the choices of other bidders can learn much more from the outcomes of a large number of completed auctions than from a particular auction in progress.
Bidders and sellers are also able to communicate anonymously by e-mail.
Bidders participating in an auction can submit a proxy bid at any time before the end of the auction. A proxy bid represents the maximum amount a bidder is willing to pay at the time of bidding. Proxy bids can be revised (increased) at any time prior to the end of the auction. As long as a bidder's proxy bid is higher than the second highest bid, she will remain the highest bidder, at a price equal to the second highest bid plus a small increment. The auction price will increase every time the second highest bid, from another bidder, increases. Bidders can also use "snipping" programs, which allow them to place a predetermined bid amount at a chosen time before the end of the auction. Bids can also be retracted, although this almost never happens. Only bids above the existing second highest bid, plus an increment, are acceptable. The highest bidder at the end of the auction wins the item at a price equal to the second highest bid, plus a small increment.
Relevance of the Dataset to the Application
Several characteristics make our dataset used in the paper unique. First, the data collected comprise all eBay market activity of a specific group of sellers for a long period of time, while the data collected by other researchers usually represent only a narrow snapshot of market activity. Second, by nature, the intrinsic value of artwork is uncertain, especially in the case of the reputable but lesser known artists in our sample. In contrast, much of the data collected by other researchers refers to items whose market value can be determined with accuracy, like coins, stamps, or computers, reducing the value of auctions as a selling, price-finding mechanism.
Our dataset highlights the usefulness of our estimation approach. As mentioned before, applying 
Late Bidding
Some authors have interpreted late bidding, or sniping, as a sign of complex strategic behavior on the part of the bidders. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) indicate that sniping is a rational response in an auction with CV and examine the prevalence of sniping in eBay markets for computers and antiques.
We determine the extent of which sniping occurs in our dataset and Table 1 presents information on the timing of winning bids using the overall sample. In our data, only a small percentage of winning bids arrive within the last five seconds, one percent in 2001 and three percent in 2004. 4 Comparing our Table 1 Figure 1 , sniping is much less prevalent in our data. 5 
Shill Bidding
Art auctions in general are known to contain shill bids where a seller in disguise bids on their own item to artificially increase the price and influence other bidders' valuations. While we cannot disprove the presence of shill bids in our data, it is extremely unlikely for numerous reasons.
Shill bidding strategies are typically used in conjunction with the resale of a fraudulent artwork purporting to be from a well known artist. 6 All the art in our dataset is original art sold directly by the artist who is a reputable lesser known artist so the typical shill bidding strategy is not applicable for two reasons. First, we have no well known artists in our dataset. Secondly, we only have self representing artists in our dataset selling their own original work so altering a painting to include a signature other than their own is not an effective way to increase the value.
Shill bidding is strictly forbidden by eBay policy. Evidence of this type of behavior results in suspension from the site, and it can also lead to serious charges like mail and wire fraud. In addition, 4 Bidding services used to place snipe bids, such as auctionsniper.com, recommend lead times between 5 and 10 seconds but indicate that lead times between 2 and 3 seconds are sufficient. The increase in late bidding observed in 2004 may be related to an improvement in the reliability of bidding services. 5 Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) study coin auctions on eBay for which they show the CV paradigm is appropriate. 6 We thank an anonymous referee to pointing out the example of the eBay shill bidding ring operated by Kenneth Walton and his partners in crime. See http://www.kennethwalton.com for more information.
eBay's policy also forbids family members, roommates or seller's employees from participating in her auctions. Thus, one relevant question is the enforceability of these policies.
The eBay "user-id" represents the online identity of the buyer/seller and is linked to his/her online reputation and past purchases/sales history on eBay. At the time of creating the account the individual is required to provide his/her name and address, as well as a bank and a credit card account. eBay uses the credit card account to verify all other information provided by the individual. Because of the wealth of data available on eBay, and accessible to anyone, there are opportunities to identify shill bidding that may not be available in other auction environments.
Next we present some points supporting the claim that there exist mechanisms in place in this market to deter and punish shill bidding.
• The news media can identify shill bidding: As mentioned before, Kenneth Walton and his colleagues operated a shill bidding ring on eBay where they resold paintings claiming to be from famous artists. 7 The New York Times exposed this bidding ring after Kenneth A.
Walton sold a fraudulent painting for $135,858 in May of 2000.
• eBay can identify shill bidding: eBay actively monitors for any signs of shill bidding and employs sophisticated software algorithms to detect shill bidding. As part of the fallout from the exposure of the shill bidding ring mentioned above, eBay stepped up their preventative efforts and developed more sophisticated algorithms designed to detect shill bidders. Since the artists in our sample have sold thousands of their own works on eBay for over four years, if these artists were placing shill bids eBay would have most likely detected this behavior, expelled them from the site, and they would not have appeared in our 2004 sample. 8 • Buyers can identify shill bidding: Observe that all relevant bidding history for any particular artist, including bidders' user-id, is available at the end of the auction, and usually remains available online for at least one month, but usually longer than that. Thus, a buyer that suspects shill bidding can examine the relevant information and can communicate her concern to eBay which then opens an investigation on the subject. The fact that all the sellers/artists in our sample enjoy outstanding reputation ratings indicates that the overwhelming majority of buyers experience satisfactory transactions. We also reviewed all negative feedbacks in our data and observed that negative feedbacks were never associated with allegations of shill bidding. 9
• Other artists can identify shill bidding: From our informal contacts with artists we have learned that some artists usually monitor the auctions of other artists and try to identify if any foul play is taking place, in which case they can communicate this finding to eBay anonymously. Why are artists acting in this way? Possible reasons may include: for some artists eBay is their only marketplace and they want to protect it, artists that sell on eBay can at the same time be buyers of art from other artists, and as expert eBay participants they can detect suspicious bidding. Professional competition can also be an important force, as an artist that obtains unusually high prices for her paintings will capture the attention and scrutiny of other artists.
• The expected punishment exceeds the expected benefit: Additionally for the artists in our sample, the expected punishment from placing shill bids far exceeds the expected benefit.
The maximum sale price in our sample is $595.55. 10 If artists in our dataset are placing shill bids, the expected benefit from a shill bidding strategy is rather small in comparison to the expected cost of punishment. Not only is shill bidding a felony 11 , but it also gets you banned from eBay for life. For the artists in our sample, eBay is typically the primary outlet for selling their work and they have gone to great lengths to amass an excellent reputation over many years, so the expected cost of being banned is most likely much larger than the expected gain from a shill bidding strategy.
In contrast with most existing research on eBay, we have access to panel data that is informative 9 Our feedback data includes all feedbacks associated with artists in our sample from the time they joined eBay. when attempting to uncover evidence of shill bidding. Because a user-id is linked to the seller's real identity, it is very difficult for a seller to bid in his/her own auctions. Thus, it is more likely that if shill bidding occurs it will be conducted by an "accomplice" with a different user-id. Also, because the name and private addresses of account holders is known to eBay, an artist would incur a significant risk if she choose as an "accomplice" a family member, with the same family name, or an individual that shares the same address.
A successful shill bidding strategy will be one in which the accomplice bids high enough to impact the selling price but not high enough to win the auction. This is a difficult balancing act. Because many auctions in our sample have a small number of bidders, and because these auctions are the ones that could benefit the most from the artificial additional level of competition generated by shill bidding, it is not unlikely that the accomplice may end up unintentionally winning the auction. Based on this description, shill bidding will be consistent with bid retraction and with repeat bidders.
An artist that repeatedly uses shill bidding will end up selling the painting to herself, that is her accomplice, from time to time. This will be the case if she overestimates the willingness to pay of real potential buyers. In such instances, the artist will still have to pay the corresponding eBay fees without making a profit for the fictitious sale of the painting and will find it difficult to attempt to sell the same painting again on eBay at a future date. Alternatively, if the artist's accomplice holds the highest bid, and believes that she will end up winning the auction, she may choose to retract her bid short before the end of the auction as a way for the artist/seller to avoid paying eBay fees (this is possible in principle, although eBay places strong restrictions on bid retractions).
Thus, if shill bidding is a prevalent strategy we would expect to observe bid retractions. In fact, bid retractions are a very rare event in our data. Less than 0.1% of bids in our data represent bid retractions. Also, when retractions occur they are mainly due to the bidder having entered the wrong bid amount, and these types of retractions are in most cases corrected right after the incorrect bid is recorded.
If shill bidding is used by an artist or an accomplice regularly, we would expect to see the recurrence of a particular user-id, or the accomplice's user-id, as the second or third highest bidder in many auctions from this artist. As we indicated before, winning is not a good shill bidding outcome, and shill bids lower than the second highest bid will have no direct impact on the final auction price.
Taking advantage of the panel structure of our dataset, we have collected information about the most frequent bidder-artist matches in our data. Table 2 of this appendix presents the results for 30 seller-bidder pairs with the highest number of occurrences. In short, our interpretation of these results is that they do not support the hypothesis of shill bidding for any of these 30 pairs.
The exception is perhaps the match (Seller A, Bidder L) but in our view this is not a suspicious match because Seller A is one of the most popular sellers in our group. Bidders in this table are frequently the winners of the auction, in average they end up winning in 29% of the auctions in which they participate. Also, the proportion of wins and second highest bids are consistent. That is, bidders with a high proportion of second highest bids also have a high proportion of wins. NOTE: Frequency is the number of auctions for Seller y which Bidder x places a bid. The Position in Auction statistics report that conditional on Bidder x participating in Seller y's auction the number of times that Bidder x is in a certain position at the end of the auction and conditional on Bidder x participating in Seller y's auction the percentage of auctions Bidder x holds a certain position in Seller y's auction.
